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KENTUCKY LAW
SURVEY
Corporations
By

WILLBURT

D. HAm*

INTRODUCTION

Once again, as with the past several Surveys,' the present
Survey will begin with a discussion of developments in corporate
law at the federal level. This discussion will be followed by
comments on a group of selected cases involving application of
corporate law principles under state law.
For the first time in several years there were no decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States directly
construing the substantive provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, out of which much of the current body of federal
corporation law has developed. 2 However, several lower federal
court decisions-in such areas as insider trading and implied
causes of action-reflect the significant effect of recent Supreme
Court decisions under that Act. Two lower court decisions involving the law of insider trading will be discussed first. One is
a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision considering the

* Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Corporations,72 Ky. L.J. 279
(1983-84); Ham, Corporations,71 Ky. L.J. 251 (1982-83); Ham, Corporations, 70 Ky.
L.J. 223 (1981-82); Ham, Corporations,69 Ky. L.J. 453 (1980-81); Ham, Corporations,
68 KY. L.J. 495 (1979-80); Ham, Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham,
Corporations, 66 Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Corporations, 65 Ky. L.J. 257 (197677); Ham, Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Corporations,63 Ky. L.J.
739 (1974-75).
There were, however, two decisions of interest by the Court during the survey
period relating to procedural matters under the federal securities laws. See Daily Income
Fund, Inc., v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984) (no prior demand on directors required
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 as prerequisite to shareholder suits brought under §
36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940); SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 2720 (1984) (no notice to target companies of third party subpoenas issued by SEC
required in nonpublic SEC investigations under federal securities laws).
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"misappropriation" theory of liability, 3 which was embraced by
concurring and dissenting Supreme Court opinions in Chiarella
v. United States.4 The other is a California federal district court
opinion recognizing and applying the "temporary insider" theory of liability,5 alluded to by the Supreme Court in Dirks v.
SEC.6 This discussion will be followed by comments on a case
from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considering implied
rights of action under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 7 and a case from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals involving use of lock-up options as a defensive tactic
to ward off takeover attemptsA
Discussion of developments in corporate law at the state
level will begin with comments on a significant recent case from
the Supreme Court of Delaware considering the operation of the
business judgment rule under Delaware law. 9 This will be followed by comments on a recent decision by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina concerning the remedies available to a court
in protecting the interests of minority shareholders in cases involving intracorporate disputes.' 0 The Survey will next comment
on a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Alaska relating
to the shareholder's right of inspection of corporate books and
records." The Survey will conclude with a discussion of a recent
Texas Supreme Court case relating to the responsibilities of
corporation directors and officers when settling claims in the
course of winding up the affairs of the corporation upon dis-

solution. 12
1 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15-17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
- See 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I would read § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 ... to mean that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.").
See also id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] person violates § 10(b) whenever he
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then
uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.").
See SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1402-03 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
6 See 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983) (under certain circumstances an outsider
may by virtue of a special relationship with the corporation become a fiduciary of the
corporation).
See Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983).
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
9 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-18 (Del. 1984).
,0 See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
See Knaebel v. Heiner, 673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983).
See Henry I. Siegel Co. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984).
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I.
A.

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

Insider Trading

Litigation involving trading on nonpublic information continues to dominate the corporate scene under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' 3 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).' 4 Much of this litigation concerns the extent to which

outsiders trading on nonpublic corporate or market information
remain vulnerable to liability under SEC Rule lOb-5 as a result
decisions in Chiarella v. United States'"
of the Supreme Court
6
and Dirks v. SEC.'

In Chiarella, an employee of a printing firm had deciphered
the names of target companies which were the subject of planned
takeover attempts and had profited by trading in the stock of
those companies for his personal benefit.' 7 The Supreme Court
held that the employee was not guilty of violating the "disclose
or abstain" rule under Rule 1Ob-5 because there was no "rela-

'1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
14See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 (1984). The full text of this rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.

is 445

U.S. 222 (1980).

16 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
" 445 U.S. at 224.
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tionship of trust and confidence" between the employee and the
sellers of target company securities. 8 Subsequently, in Dirks, the
Court reaffirmed its position that there must be a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to impose a duty to
disclose.' 9 The Court held that tippees of nonpublic corporate
information, who had received the information from corporate
insiders, were prohibited from trading on this information only
when the insiders had breached their fiduciary duties to the
and the tippees knew or should
shareholders of their corporation
20
have known of the breach.
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Chiarella, the Sec-2
ond Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Newman, '
upheld a criminal indictment charging violations of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 on the part of corporate outsiders trading on
nonpublic market information. 22 The Government charged that
Courtois and Antoniu, employees of the investment banking

,1445 U.S. at 230. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rejected the "equal
access to information" test which Chief Judge Kaufman had applied when Chiarella
was before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). In rejecting the "equal access" test, Justice Powell said: "We
hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information." 445 U.S. at 235. Stressing the need for the existence of
a relationship between Chiarella and the sellers of stock that could give rise to a duty
to disclose, Justice Powell remarked:
[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is
absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior
dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he
was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.
He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions.
Id. at 232-33.
,1See 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
20 Justice Powell, again writing for the majority, remarked: "[Tihe test is whether
the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a
breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach." Id. Finding no breach of duty on
the part of the insiders to the shareholders of the corporation in disclosing the information they possessed to Dirks, Justice Powell concluded that Dirks could not be held
liable to those shareholders as a "tippee." See id. at 3267-68.
2,664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
22 See id. at 15-19. A distinction is sometimes made between market information,
which affects the market for a company's securities, and corporate information, which
affects its assets and earning power. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial
Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. Rnv.
798, 799 (1973).
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firms Morgan Stanley & Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co., had mis-

appropriated confidential information concerning certain proposed mergers and acquisitions and had profited through
subsequent trading in the stock of the target companies by

Newman (and other confederates) to whom the information had
been conveyed. 23 In upholding the criminal indictment, the court
noted that in Newman the Government had remedied the deficiency that had led to its failure to secure a conviction of the
defendant in Chiarella.24 The court pointed out that while "[t]he
thrust of the Government's case in Chiarella was that the de-

fendant violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by failing to
disclose material, non-public information to the shareholders of

target companies from whom he purchased stock,

' 25

in Newman

the Government had pursued a more promising legal theory by
charging "that Courtois and Antoniu breached the trust and
confidence placed in them and their employers by the employers'

corporate clients and the clients' shareholders, and the trust and
confidence placed in Courtois and Antoniu by their employers,"
and that Newman had participated in this conduct. 26 The court

held that this theory of "misappropriation" of confidential information was sufficient to sustain a criminal indictment by the

Government under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 27 The court
also held that the purchaser-seller standing requirement imposed

on plaintiffs in private civil damage actions under section28 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 was inapplicable to criminal indictments.
11

664 F.2d at 15.

U

Id.

2 Id.
16

Id. at 15-16.

" Id. at 16. The seeds for the "misappropriation" theory had been sown in
Chiarella where it had been offered by the Government as an alternative basis to support
Chiarella's conviction. Refusing to consider such a theory since he did not believe the
jury instructions covered it, Justice Powell stated: "[W]e will not speculate upon whether
such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes
a violation of § 10(b)." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 236-37.
n' See 664 F.2d at 16-17. The purchaser-seller standing requirement for civil damage
suits brought under SEC Rule lOb-5, sometimes referred to as the Birnbaum rule because
of its origin in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952), was approved by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Newman, the court of appeals, stressing the
language of Rule lOb-5 which condemns fraudulent activity "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," commented that in injunctive suits brought by the
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Despite its willingness to embrace the misappropriation theory in the context of a criminal indictment, in Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc.,29 the Second Circuit recently conceded-with regard to the same underlying facts as alleged in Newman-that
it was not free to extend the misappropriation theory to sellers
of target company shares who sold their shares prior to public
30
announcement of the merger offers.
Acting on behalf of himself and other investors similarly
situated, Moss sought to recover damages from Newman under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 31 Moss alleged that the damages
resulted from the plaintiffs' sales of shares in Deseret Pharmaceutical Co. at a time when Newman was purchasing shares in
Deseret at the urging of Courtois who, as an employee of
Morgan Stanley & Co., had acquired knowledge of WarnerLambert's plans to make a tender offer for Deseret stock. 32 The
district court granted Newman's motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action. 33 The Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to show that any of the defendants
owed him a duty of disclosure as required, under Chiarella and
34
Dirks, to sustain a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Plaintiff had argued that, under Newman, "because Courtois
owed a 'fiduciary duty' to his employer, Morgan Stanley, and
to Morgan Stanley's client, Warner, then Newman (standing in
Courtois' shoes) owed a separate duty of disclosure to Deseret
shareholders. ' 35 Rejecting this argument, the court replied:
"Nothing in our opinion in Newman suggests that an employee's
duty to 'abstain or disclose' with respect to his employer should
be stretched to encompass an employee's 'duty of disclosure' to

SEC under § 21 of the 1934 Act or in criminal prosecutions brought by the Government
under § 32 of the Act, "the court's concern must be with the scope of the Rule, not
plaintiff's standing to sue." 664 F.2d at 16-17. The court added: "It is only because the
judiciary has created a private cause of action for damages the 'contours' of which are
not described in the statute, that standing in such cases has become a pivotal issue."
Id. at 17.
719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
See id. at 15-16.
See id. at 8.
32 Id.
" See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See 719 F.2d at 12-13.
3 Id. at 13.

1985]

CORPORATIONS

the general public." '3 6 Therefore, the court said, it followed that
"the district court was correct in concluding that 'plaintiff cannot hope to piggyback upon the duty owed by defendants to
37
Morgan Stanley and Warner.'
In addition to urging the extension of Newman to cover suits
brought by private parties, the plaintiff in Moss sought to have
the court "recognize an exception to Chiarella and allow a
section 10(b) cause of action against any person who trades on
the basis of nonpublic 'misappropriated' information. ' 38 Plaintiff contended that the court's recognition of the misappropriation theory was "necessary to effectuate the remedial purposes
of the securities laws." 3 9 The court responded that "plaintiff's
'misappropriation' theory would grant him a windfall recovery
4
simply to discourage tortious conduct by securities purchasers,' '
thereby creating a new species of "fraud" which would conflict
with the requirement in Chiarella that-for fraud to exist in
nondisclosure cases-there must be a specific relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty to disclose. 4' Accordingly,
the court concluded that, since plaintiff's "misappropriation"
theory would clearly contradict the holdings of the Supreme
Court in both Chiarella and Dirks, plaintiff's complaint "fails
42
to state a valid section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 cause of action."

Id.
Id. (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. at 1353).
" See 719 F.2d at 15. In his Chiarella dissent, Chief Justice Burger had urged a
similar broad application of the "misappropriation" theory. See 445 U.S. at 239 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). After agreeing that "[a]s a general rule, neither party to an arm'slength business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless
the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation," Justice Burger added that,
nevertheless, "the rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained,
not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means." Id. at
239-40. Justice Burger concluded: "I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass
and build on this principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading." Id. at 240. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Chiarella,agreed with
Chief Justice Burger that, as a matter of substantive law, "a person violates § 10(b)
whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information
which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring).
19719 F.2d at 16.
,0 Id.
4' Id.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 227-28.
41 719 F.2d at 16. Analogizing the position of the defendants to that of Chiarella
and Dirks, the court said:
36
17
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While the decision in Moss may have eliminated the misap-

propriation theory as a tool for private parties asserting damage
claims against outsiders under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
insider trading cases, the theory would appear to remain a viable

43
policing tool in actions brought by the SEC. In SEC v. Materia,4

the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York recently recognized the availability of the misappropriation theory in SEC actions brought against outsiders trading
on nonpublic information. This case involved a suit brought by
the SEC against Materia, a copyholder employed by a financial
printing firm, who, with others, purchased publicly traded securities that were to become the subject of tender offers. 45 Before
making the purchases, Materia had deciphered the identities of
the target companies. 46 After public announcement of the tender
offers, Materia sold the purchased stock at a profit. 47 The district

court treated the case as governed by Newman rather than by

Moss.45 The court found that the SEC occupied a position anal-

ogous to the Government in Newman since "a suit for injunctive
relief instituted by the Commission under section 21(d) is akin
to a criminal prosecution, insofar as its purpose is to deter future
fraudulent conduct and to effectuate public policy." '49 Empha-

sizing that the SEC had framed its amended complaint in terms
of the employee's breach of duty to his employer and its clients,

°

The defendants in this case-Courtois and his tippees Antoniu and Newman-owed no duty of disclosure to Moss. In working for Morgan Stanley,
neither Courtois nor Newman was a traditional "corporate insider," and
neither had received any confidential information from the target Deseret.
Instead, like Chiarella and Dirks, the defendants were "complete stranger[s]
who dealt with the sellers [of Deseret stock] only through impersonal
market transactions."
Id. at 15. (brackets supplied by the court) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
at 232-33).
41The SEC has intensified its efforts at policing insider trading activity because
of its concern as to the deleterious effect it believes such activity has on the integrity of
the security markets. For a defense of insider trading based on the "efficient market"
hypothesis, see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING IN TIE STOCK MARKET (1966).
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,526 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
14, 1983).
41See id. at 97,026.
6 Id.
41 See id.
41

See id. at 97,028.

49 Id.

,o Id.
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the district court denied Materia's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.-' The court distinguished Chiarella by noting that
"[i]n Chiarella, the defendant's criminal conviction rested exclu'52
sively upon allegations of duties owed to selling shareholders.
It would appear, therefore, that unless or until the Supreme
Court rejects the misappropriation theory, this theory will remain an important weapon in the arsenal available to the SEC
53
in its campaign against the evils of insider trading.
B.

Temporary Insiders

Another avenue for reaching insider trading activity on the
part of corporate outsiders which has emerged since Chiarella
and Dirks is the "temporary insider" theory, recognized by the
Supreme Court in Dirks.5 4 Writing for the majority in Dirks,
Justice Powell remarked that "[u]nder certain circumstances,
such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to
an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. ' 55 Justice Powell noted that "[t]he basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons
acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes. 5 6 He cautioned: "For
such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect

Id. at 97,029. In a later opinion, the district court after trial ordered a permanent
injunction against Materia as requested by the SEC and also ordered disgorgement of
his profits computed as the court had directed. See SEC v. Materia, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,583, at 97,285 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1983).
"Z[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,526, at 97,028.
Pointing out that Newman involved allegations of fraud perpetrated on bidders making
tender offers, the court remarked as to the charges filed by the SEC in Materia: "[Tihe
SEC has framed its amended complaint exclusively in terms of Materia's breach of his
duty to Bowne and its clients. As so pleaded, the defendant's liability depends in no
way upon any duty owed to selling shareholders such as Moss, or losses incurred by
them." Id.
" The SEC's position in this regard was further strengthened when the Second
Circuit recently affirmed the decision of the district court in Materia. See SEC v. Materia,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
14 See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
55Id.
56 Id.
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the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confi57
dential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty."
The "temporary insider" concept was recognized recently in
SEC v. Lund. 8 In that case, Lund-the Chief Executive Officer,
President, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Verit
Industries-acquired inside information from a business associate, Horowitz, who held like positions in P & F Industries, Inc.
and who also was a director in Verit.5 9 Horowitz informed Lund
that P & F had entered into negotiations with the Jockey Club
Casino Corporation concerning a joint venture involving a gambling casino in Las Vegas. 6° Before public announcement of the
joint venture, Lund purchased 10,000 shares of stock in P & F
at $1.25 a share, which he later sold at an average price of $2.50
per share. 61 The SEC brought suit under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 seeking injunctive relief and an order requiring Lund to
disgorge the profits he made from the purchase and subsequent
62
sale of the stock.
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California refused to grant an injunction 63 but did order disgorgement of the profits received by Lund. 64 Noting the position

57

Id.

11 See 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
19 Id. at 1399.
60 Id.
61 Id.

at 1400.

See id. at 1399; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5.
61 570 F. Supp. at 1403-04. The court said:
Although the evidence presented at trial showed that Lund knowingly
traded on material nonpublic information, the circumstances surrounding
this trade suggest that it was an isolated occurrence. Lund simply saw an
opportunity and took it. Although Lund has never admitted the conduct,
or that it was wrongful, the Court finds that this is not evidence of a
propensity to commit future violations. Lund indicates that he intends and
has always intended to comply with the requirements of the federal securities laws. His profession is not likely to lead him into future violations.
Upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden in seeking permanent
injunctive relief. Plaintiff's prayer for such relief is, therefore, denied.
Id. (footnote omitted).
61 Id. at 1404. The court said:
It is now well established that the Court may, in the exercise of its equitable
powers, order disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action. Where liability
under § 10(b) has been established the Court should fashion relief structured to deprive the defendant of all gains flowing from the illegal activity.
Disgorgement of Lund's profit of $12,500.00 is, therefore, appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
62
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of the Supreme Court in Dirks that "liability cannot be imposed
unless the 'tipper' has breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach," the court
first concluded that the SEC had correctly abandoned its argument that Lund was subject to tippee liability under section
65
10(b):
It is clear in this case that Horowitz did not breach his fiduciary duty to P & F or its shareholders by disclosing information concerning the Jockey Club joint venture to Lund. His
disclosure of this information was within the scope of his
authority as an officer and director of the corporation. Absent
a breach of a fiduciary duty by Horowitz, Lund cannot be
liable under § 10(b) as a tippee. 66
Although the court did not believe that Lund was liable for
insider trading as a tippee, the court did find that insider trading
liability could be imposed on Lund under a flexible approach to
the concept of "insider." 67 The court reasoned that "[a]lthough
corporate insiders are traditionally defined as officers, directors
and controlling shareholders of the corporation, a consistent
body of case law makes clear that the scope of the concept
'insider' is flexible," ' 68 and can include " 'those persons who are
in a special relationship with the company and privy to its
internal affairs.' "69 The court added:
Persons who, although not traditional "insiders," nevertheless become fiduciaries of the corporation and the shareholders could be called "temporary insiders." They assume
the duties of an insider temporarily, by virtue of a special
relationship with the corporation. A temporary insider is subject to liability under § 10(b) for trading on the basis of
nonpublic material information received in the context of the
special relationship.70

"

Id. at 1402.

6

Id.

6, See

id.

I Id.

Id. (quoting In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
70

Id.

at 1403 (footnotes omitted).
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Applying the temporary insider concept, the court stressed
the close business ties between Lund and Horowitz and the desire
of Horowitz to afford Verit an opportunity, through Lund, to
participate in the P & F joint venture. 7' The court observed that
Lund should have realized that the information being given to
him by Horowitz was of a confidential nature and was being
disclosed to him solely for legitimate corporate purposes .72 The
court concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, Lund became
a temporary P & F insider upon receipt of the information
concerning the Jockey Club project and assumed an insider's
duty to 'disclose or abstain' from trading based on that infor73
mation."
A significant aspect of this case is the apparent willingness
of the court to extend the temporary insider concept to cover
persons-even though not underwriters, accountants, or lawyers-who might be thought, because of their special expertise,
to have a more definite role to play in corporate matters related
to the information disclosed. 74 This expansive interpretation of
the temporary insider concept, if followed by other courts, could
serve to reduce the limiting effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks."
C. Implied Remedies
The question of the existence of implied private civil actions
under the federal securities laws continues to arise in the lower
77
federal courts.7 6 Recently, in Indiana National Corp. v. Rich,
See id.
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 For general discussions of the subject of insider trading, see Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 322 (1979); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1982-83).
71 Of course, all of this remains unclear at this point. As one writer has observed
regarding Dirks: "[D]espite its unusual fact situation, Dirksimposes some broad practical
and theoretical barriers to the imposition of inside trading liability on tippees and tippers
(especially inadvertent tippees and tippees of negligent tippers). Unclear is the opinion's
effect on the misappropriation theory." Wang, Recent Developments in the FederalLaw
Regulating Stock Market Trading, 6 Corn,. L. REv. 291, 328 (1983).
76 See Comment, Implied Rights of Action in FederalLegislation:Harmonization
Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928.
7 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983).
71
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to join
the other federal circuits that have recognized the existence of
an implied private right of action by an issuer corporation seeking an injunction under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.78 Section 13(d), which was added to the Exchange
Act in 1968 as part of the Williams Act amendments, 79 "requires
any person acquiring more than 5% of a class of registered
securities of a corporation to send to the issuer and to file with

the S.E.C. a statement disclosing certain information about the
person's identity and purposes."

0

In Rich, a group of investors, having acquired more than
five percent of the stock of Indiana National Corporation, filed a

Schedule 13D with the SEC as required by section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act."' Indiana National Corporation lodged a com-

,1See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1101 (1981) (court can grant injunctive relief under § 13d); GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) (issuer has
standing under § 13d to seek relief). See also Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (injunctive relief justified only if can show irreparable
harm in absence of such relief); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st
Cir. 1977) (injunctive relief under § 13d available only on showing of irreparable harm).
See generally Comment, PrivateRights of Action for Damages Under Section 13(d), 32
STAN. L. Rav. 581 (1979-80).
71 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f) (1982).
10 712 F.2d at 1181.
1I Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1). The relevant portions of this section read:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to
section 781 of this title ... is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such
acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its principal executive
office, by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the
security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing
such of the following information, and such additional information, as the
Commission may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protecton of investors(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the
nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons
by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to
be used in making the purchases ... ;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to
or merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in
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plaint charging defendant investors with having included false

and misleading information in their Schedule 13D.82 Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Indiana National Corporation lacked standing to bring a suit
under section 13(d).83 Concluding that the existence of express
remedies-including SEC action-in the Exchange Act indicates
that Congress did not intend to provide a private right under
section 13(d) 8 4 the district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss.' 5 Disagreeing with this conclusion, the court of ap6
peals reversed the judgment of the district court.1

In finding that a private cause of action for injunctive relief
should be recognized on behalf of Indiana National Corporation,

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that recent Supreme
Court decisions have established congressional intent as the cen-

tral factor for determining the existence of implied causes of
action in the securities laws. 87 Furthermore, the court noted: "In

its business or corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which
... ;and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements,
any person with respect to any securities of the
persons with whom such contracts, arrangements,
been entered into, and giving the details thereof.

are beneficially owned
or understandings with
issuer ... naming the
or understandings have

Id.
Under SEC Rule 13d-1, any person acquiring beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of an equity security required to be registered with the SEC pursuant to §
12 of the Securities Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D (or Schedule 13G) with the
Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1984).
82 See 712 F.2d at 1181. The allegations included charges that the Schedule 13D
filed by defendants was defective because it failed to disclose the defendants' intention
"to acquire control of Indiana National, the Federal Reserve Bank's prior denial of an
application by certain of the defendants for control of another bank, certain information
concerning the members of the group and the true source of the funds used to acquire
the shares." Id.
83 Id.
at 1181-82. Plaintiff had sought a court order compelling defendants to file
an amended Schedule 13D, enjoining defendants from acquiring additional Indiana
National shares, and compelling defendants to divest themselves of the shares unlawfully
acquired. Id. at 1181.
See id.at 1182.
8I Id. at 1184.
86 Id. at 1181.
" See id.
at 1182. The Supreme Court's current restrictive attitude toward implied
private causes of action may be traced to the Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975). The Court there established a four-point test:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
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perusing the legislative history for signs of congressional intent,
we are directed to pay particular attention to the contemporary
legal context in which the statute was enacted.''88
Applying this approach to section 13(d), the court noted that
the Williams Act was designed to extend to corporate acquisi-

tions the protections already available to investors under the
proxy rules adopted pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act,8 9 and that at the time of the Act's enactment an implied
right of action on the part of an issuer corporation had already

been established under section 14(a). 90 Thus, the court considered

itself "justified in assuming ... that Congress was aware of
this precedent when the Williams Act was enacted upon the
model of a prior statute." 9'
The court treated as even more important the failure of
Congress to negate a section 13(d) private right of action during
subsequent amendments to the Williams Act. 92 Following the
lead of the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ...Third, is
it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action

one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?
422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). Later, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568 (1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16
(1979), the Court narrowed the test to one of congressional intent. The Court, in Touche
Ross, referred to the first three factors listed in Cort as related to "the language and
focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose." 442 U.S. at 576-77. Given
this precedent, the Rich court remarked: "In this formulation, the Court seems not only
to have abandoned an explicit point-by-point Cort analysis for the underlying inquiry
about congressional intent but also to have recharacterized the first three Cort factors
as being equivalent to statutory language, legislative history and purpose." 712 F.2d at
1185.
, 712 F.2d at 1182 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court emphasized this approach to legislative intent in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 378-79 (1982) (recognizing an implied private cause of action under the
Commodities Exchange Act). See note 93 infra.
19See 712 F.2d at 1183.
9oId. This had been the position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969) and Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694-95 (2d Cir.
1966).
" 712 F.2d at 1183.
92See id. at 1184.
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Smith v. Curran,93 the court concluded that "[s]ince Congress
amended the Act while leaving this remedy intact, we conclude
that the legislature affirmatively intended to preserve the remedy

of a private right of action for issuer corporations under Section
13(d)."

' 94

The court also emphasized that, unless an issuer corporation

has a private right of action under section 13(d), the objectives
of the statute will not be realized. 95 Pointing out that the legislative history of the Williams Act revealed an intention to protect

shareholders, 96 and that "[t]he only party with both the capability and incentive to pursue these violations" of section 13(d)
would be the issuer corporation, 97 the court concluded that its

interpretation of the statute to accord a right of action in the
issuer corporation was "the only construction which can make
the Section 13(d) disclosure requirements effective at all.'"'9

"I See 456 U.S. 353. In recognizing the existence of an implied private cause of
action under the Commodities Exchange Act, the Court said:
In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal
statutory scheme when the statute by its terms is silent on that issue, the
initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was
enacted. More precisely, we must examine Congress' perception of the law
that it was shaping or reshaping. When Congress enacts new legislation,
the question is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy as a
supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the statute. When
Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied private remedy
has already been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry logically
is different. Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy, since
one already existed; the question is whether Congress intended to preserve
the pre-existing remedy.
Id. at 378-79 (footnote omitted).
712 F.2d at 1184.
See id.at 1185.
IId.
Id. at 1184. The court remarked:
The manner in which such protection is to be provided, however, is by
generating a "fair fight" between the incumbent management and the
persons believed to be seeking to acquire control, in order that the shareholders may make an intelligent decision between them when called upon
to do so. Yet the shareholders have neither the knowledge nor the capacity
to ensure that Section 13(d) is enforced and a "fair fight" thus provided.
In this respect and for this limited purpose, therefore, the issuer corporation
acts on the shareholders' behalf in bringing a suit for injunctive relief until
an accurate Schedule 13(d) is filed.
Id. at 1185.
" See id. at 1184. The information required to be filed by § 13(d) goes to the
SEC and the issuer corporation but is not disseminated to the shareholders of the
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It may be true that the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated "an increasingly reluctant attitude toward implying any
private right of action in securities cases." 99 Nevertheless, the
Court's latest opinions seem to reflect a softening in this attitude
by adopting a more flexible approach to the ascertainment of
legislative intent. ' ° The Seventh Circuit's decision in Rich seems
consistent with the Court's present approach.
D.

Tender Offers

Corporate takeovers remains one of the most active areas in
corporation law today.' 0' Perhaps no aspect of that subject has
created more attention recently than the defensive tactics used
by target company managements to ward off hostile takeover
attempts.' 0 2 One such defensive tactic is target company managements' use of "lock-up" options to lessen the attractiveness
of their companies as takeover targets.' 0 3 The lock-up has been
referred to as "an arrangement whereby the target company
agrees to sell or grants an option to sell assets, treasury stock
or authorized-but-unissued stock to a white knight to give the

corporation. The SEC by its own admission does not consider itself in a position to
police § 13(d) violations because of the volume of disclosure documents filed with the
Commission. Thus, the court concluded:
The only party with both the capability and incentive to pursue these
violations is the issuer corporation. Our conclusion that Congress intended
that a private right of action for an issuer corporation be implied under
Section 13(d) is thus inescapable if the objectives of the statute are to be
realized.
Id.
" W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 298 (5th
ed. unabr. 1980).
100The recent Supreme Court decision in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375 (1983) is evidence of this attitude. In that case, the Court recognized that a
cause of action could be maintained under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 for alleged misrepresentations in a registration statement for a new issue of securities
despite the existence of an express remedy for such misstatements under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933. See id. at 380-87.
,0, For a general discussion of tender offers as a source of corporate takeovers, see

E. ARANow, H.

EINHORN &

CORPORATE CONTROL
RATE CONTROL

G.

BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR

(1977); E. ARANoW & H. EINHORN,

TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-

(1973).

101See Note, Defensive Tactics and the Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board
of Directors, 7 J. CoRP. L. 579, 579 (1981-82).
,01See Lewkow & Forrest, The Lock-Up Under Exchange Act Sec. 14(e), 6 THE
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 15.
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friendly suitor a competitive advantage over a raider in the
takeover battle."' 0 4
The legality of the lock-up option as a legitimate defensive
tactic has been challenged as involving use of a "manipulative"

device in violation of the antifraud provisions of section 14(e)
of the Williams Act.105 This challenge met with success in Mobil

Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 0 6 when the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals condemned as manipulative devices the use of lock-up
options by Marathon Oil Co. (Marathon) in its efforts to thwart

a takeover attempt by Mobil Corporation (Mobil). 10 7 Marathon
had granted to United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel),
which was making a competing tender offer, an option to pur-

chase ten million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon
common stock and an option to purchase Marathon's forty-eight
percent interest in the Yates Field, a property containing valuable
oil reserves. 08 This latter option could be exercised by U.S. Steel

only if U.S. Steel's offer failed and a third party gained control
of Marathon.'0 9 Due to the value of Yates Field oil reserves, the

Id. (footnote omitted). These commentators acknowledge:
The term "lock-up" is a misnomer; more often than not the device does
not lock-up the target company for the white knight, but rather gives it a
"leg-up" over the raider. Nevertheless, it often leads to the effects intended
by the target company: it deters the raider from going forward with its
bid by making the target a less attractive, more expensive and more difficult
company to take over.

104

Id.
105 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id.
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
at 377. After Mobil announced its intention to acquire Marathon, the
Marathon board of directors, concerned about the effects of a merger with Mobil,
determined that one of Marathon's alternatives was to seek a more attractive merger
candidate. Negotiations by Marathon with several other companies ultimately resulted
in a merger agreement with United States Steel Corporation. Id. at 367.
-o'Id. The ten million authorized but unissued shares equalled approximately 17%
of Marathon's then outstanding stock. Id.
0, Id. This option had the potential effect of preventing a competing tender offeror
from acquiring Yates Field upon merger with Marathon. See id.
106

107Id.
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Yates Field option was a significant deterrent to other bidders
since, even if they succeeded in gaining control of Marathon,
they would lose those reserves."10 The court remarked that "it is
difficult to conceive of a more effective and manipulative device
than the 'lock-up' options employed here, options which not
only artificially affect, but for all practical purposes completely
block, normal healthy market activity and, in fact, could be
construed as expressly designed solely for that purpose.""'
In Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.," 2 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently took a contrary view
of the legality, under the Williams Act, of lock-up options. The
management of Datatab, Inc. (Datatab), a New York corporation engaged in the market research business, had negotiated a
merger agreement with CRC Acquisition Corp. (CRC), a corporation operating in the same field."13 Under this agreement, a
wholly owned CRC subsidiary was to be merged into Datatab
and the holders of Datatab common stock were to receive $1.00
per share in cash." 4 A special meeting of the shareholders of
Datatab was called to obtain the necessary approval of the
merger as required by New York law." 5 Two days before the
scheduled, date of this meeting, Data Probe Acquisition Corp.
(Data Probe), a New York corporation likewise engaged in the
market research business, made a cash tender offer of $1.25 per

110See id. at 375. The significance potential buyers placed on Yates Field, which
Marathon had referred to as its "crown jewel," was underscored by the fact that when
Allied Industries and Gulf Oil indicated interest in making a tender offer for Marathon
stock, they both conditioned their willingness to make a tender offer on being assured
that they would be given an option to acquire Marathon's interest in Yates Field. Id. at

367-68.
M Id. at 374. The court also concluded:
We are of the opinion that under the circumstances of this particular case,
Mobil has shown a sufficient likelihood of ultimately establishing that the
Yates Field option and the stock option had the effect of creating an
artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for Marathon common
shares, and that the options therefore are "manipulative acts or practices"
in connection with a tender offer in violation of section 14(e) of the
Williams Act.
Id. at 375.
112722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
M Id. at 2.
"' Id.
115Id.
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share for Datatab's common stock. 1 6 After quickly adjourning
the special shareholders' meeting, Datatab and CRC held further
negotiations and formulated a revised merger agreement whereby
Datatab shareholders would receive $1.40 per share for their
stock.1 1 7 As part of the revised agreement, Datatab granted CRC
a one-year irrevocable option to purchase authorized but unissued shares of Datatab stock at $1.40 per share." 8 By exercising
this option, CRC could acquire control of Datatab regardless of
how many outstanding Datatab shares were tendered to Data
Probe." 9 CRC would then be in a position to vote its Datatab
stock for the merger of Datatab with CRC's subsidiary. 20 Data
Probe commenced an action seeking an injunction barring exercise of the option by Datatab on the ground that the option
constituted a "manipulative act or practice" in violation of
section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act.' 2 ' The district court
granted judgment in favor of Data Probe.' The Second Circuit
123
Court of Appeals reversed.
The court of appeals treated Data Probe's complaint as
essentially a charge that the management of Datatab, by granting
the option to CRC, had breached its fiduciary obligations to the
shareholders of Datatab 24 The court concluded that, in view of
5
the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,this was not a wrong that it was "free to condemn under existing
federal legislation.""- 26 In Santa Fe Industries, the Supreme Court
had emphasized that the fundamental purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act was to implement a philosophy of full disclo-

116

Id.

"I Id. at 3.
's

Id.

19 Id.

Id.
"2 See id. At the same time that Data Probe commenced its suit to have the option
120

declared invalid, it increased its offer for Datatab shares to $1.55 per share but conditioned its offer on either termination of the CRC option or a court determination that
the option was invalid. Id.
"I Id. The district court concluded that the option was prohibited by § 14(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 1538, 1561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326
(1984).
I See 722 F.2d at 6.
4 See id. at 4.
-- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
"126
722 F.2d at 4.

19851

CORPORATIONS

sure,' 27 and had referred to the term "manipulative"-as used
in section 10(b) of that Act-as a term that "refers generally to
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices,
that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity."' 2 Pointing out that it had previously held this
construction of the term "manipulative" to be applicable to
section 14(e),' 29 the Second Circuit concluded that "[a] complaint
which alleges only that management has for self-serving reasons
acted so as to deprive shareholders of a favorable financial
opportunity does not state a valid claim under Section 14(e),
therefor [sic]."130 The court stated that it disagreed with the
decision of the Sixth Circuit in Marathon "to the extent that
Marathon creates judge made substantive obligations imposed
upon offerors or the management of offerees engaged in a tender
offer contest .
,,1", The court reiterated its observation, made
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.,' that Marathon was
" 'an unwarranted extension of the Williams Act.' ,,,3
There are indications that the viewpoint of the Second Circuit
in Datatab regarding the need for some form of misrepresentation to bring a case within section 14(e) of the Williams Act will
emerge as the accepted viewpoint for fraud cases brought under

See 430 U.S. at 477-78.
,2, Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
'11 722 F.2d at 4, citing Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir.
1982).
10 722 F.2d at 4. Emphasizing that misrepresentation was "an essential element of
a cause of action under Section 14(e)," the court said:
The gravamen of the claim advanced here is a breach of management's
fiduciary duty to shareholders, a matter traditionally committed to state
law, which, if entertained, would unquestionably embark us on a course
leading to a federal common law of fiduciary obligations. We decline to
embark on such a course under Section 14(e).
Id. The court referred to a statement made by the Supreme Court in SantaFe Industries:
"Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." 430 U.S. at 479, quoted in, Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722
F.2d at 4.
M 722 F.2d at 5.
132 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
"1 722 F.2d at 5 (quoting 717 F.2d at 760).
127
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that Act. 3 4 As applied to lock-up options, the following obser-

vations have been made:
In the absence of inadequate or misleading disclosure, then, it
appears that courts will scrutinize lock-ups pursuant to state
law fiduciary duty standards rather than Sec. 14(e) standards.
That is, of course, unless the court happens to be located in
the 6th Circuit, in which event the spectre of Mobil may
overcome the sounder approach of the 2d Circuit in Buffalo
Forge and Data Probe.'35
II.
A.

STATE CORPORATION LAW

Business Judgment Rule

Turning to developments in state corporation law, no doubt
one of the more significant cases decided during the Survey
period was the Delaware case of Aronson v. Lewis. 3 6 Aronson
is a sequel to the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,137 and futher considers the application of the business judgment rule in the context of share38
holder derivative suits.1

In Zapata, the court had been concerned with the applicability of the business judgment rule to the determination-made
by a special litigation committee of the board of directors-that
a shareholders' derivative suit brought against the corporation

and certain of its directors should be dismissed.

39

The court

"3 For a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
following the Second
Circuit in requiring some form of deception for actions brought under § 14(e), see
Schreiber v. Burlington N., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
In this case a shareholder of a target company sought to assert a claim under § 14(e)
for a lost opportunity to profit from a hostile tender offer when the management of the
target company negotiated a new and friendly takeover arrangement. The new offer was
less advantageous to the shareholders of the target company than that tendered under
the first offer. See id. at 164-65.
"I Lewkow & Forrest, supra note 103, at 21.

136 473

A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).

1 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
I's The business judgment rule is a facet of the duty of care owed by a board of
directors to the corporation's shareholders in the management of a corporation. The
rule says that if the board of directors has exercised proper diligence in exercising its
managerial responsibilities, then the courts will not interfere with good faith business
decisions of the board. See H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CoRPoA~ioNs AND
BUSINEss ENTERPRISES
139See 430 A.2d at 785.

OTHER

§ 242 (3d

ed. 1983).
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concluded that in the demand-excused cases, where the stockholder possesses the right to bring a suit on the corporation's

behalf, a middle course should be steered "between those cases
which yield to the independent business judgment of a board
committee" and those "which would yield to unbridled plaintiff
stockholder control."' 40 To achieve a proper balance between
"stockholder power" and "detrimental litigation,"' 14' the court
directed the Delaware Court of Chancery to apply a two-step
test. 42 The court of chancery should first "inquire into the
independence and good faith of the committee and the bases
supporting its conclusions.' '1 43 As a second test the court of
chancery "should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted."' 144 The
supreme court made it clear that this two-step test applies only
to those cases where the shareholder possesses the right to bring
suit on behalf of the corporation because demand on the board
of directors to bring the suit had been excused as futile. 4 5 In
those instances where a demand on the board of directors is
required but has been refused, the board's refusal, if not wrongful, is governed by the "business judgment rule" and terminates
146
the shareholder's right to bring the derivative action.

11

Id. at 788.

MISee id. at 787. The court said:
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively simple. If, on
the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest bona fide derivative
actions away from well-meaning derivative plaintiffs through the use of
the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of
its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors ....
If, on the other hand, corporations are
unable to rid themselves of meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits,
the derivative action, created to benefit the corporation, will produce the
opposite, unintended result.... It thus appears desirable to us to find a
balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate
causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors,
but the corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation.
Id. at 786-87 (citations omitted).
"I See id. at 788.
"'

Id.

- Id. at 789 (footnote omitted). In explaining the need for the second step the
court said that "[t]he second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions
meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving
of further consideration in the corporation's interest." Id.
See id. at 784.
See id. at 784 & n.lO.
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In Aronson, the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized that
Zapata had "left a crucial issue unanswered: when is a stockholder's demand upon a board of directors, to redress an alleged
wrong to the corporation, excused as futile prior to the filing of
a derivative suit?" 1 47 The court addressed this issue by stating:
"In our view demand can only be excused where facts are alleged
with particularity which create a reasonable doubt that the directors' action was entitled to the protections of the business
148
judgment rule.'
The suit in Aronson had been brought by a shareholder of
Meyers Parking System, Inc. (Meyers), 149 as a shareholders' derivative suit on behalf of Meyers. The suit named Meyers and
its ten directors as defendants and sought cancellation of an
employment contract entered into between Meyers and a Meyers
director who owned forty-seven percent of the company's outstanding stock. 50 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
action because the plaintiff had failed either to demand that the
board of directors take action to correct the alleged wrong or
to demonstrate that a demand would have been futile.15 ' The
court of chancery denied the motion on the ground that "plaintiff's allegations raised a 'reasonable inference' that the direc52
tors' action was unprotected by the business judgment rule.'2
Disagreeing with the Vice Chancellor's formulation of the concept of demand futility, the Supreme Court of Delaware re53
versed.
In rejecting the "reasonable inference" test and adopting the
"reasonable doubt" test, the court indicated that in its view
"the entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to
issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine's
applicability. ' 4 The court observed that "[t]he thrust of Zapata
is that in either the demand-refused or the demand-excused case,

1" 473 A.2d at 807.
,,'
Id. at 808.
149 Id.
Id. at 808-09.
See id. at 807-08.
's' Id.
at 808.
153See id.
'1 Id. at 812.
'1
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the board still retains its ...

managerial authority to make

decisions regarding corporate litigation.'

' 1 5 The

court instructed:

[1]n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the
proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under
the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created
that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise
the product of a
56
valid exercise of business judgment.
Thus, if the directors meet the test of being disinterested and
independent, so that their decisions are subject to the protections
of the business judgment rule, those decisions must still meet
the substantive test of being business judgments. 57 The court
said that the exercise of business judgment would require that
directors properly inform themselves of all available information
before making a business decision.'58 Once properly informed,
the directors would be liable only if their actions were grossly
negligent and thus in violation of the Delaware standard of care
for discharging their duty under the business judgment rule.s 9
It seems clear from Aronson that the court was concerned
about the effect the derivative shareholder action might have on
the freedom of directors to manage the corporation, 160 and about
the need, through enforcement of the demand requirement, to

M"
Id. at 813. The relevant portion of § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law provides: "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
156473 A.2d at 814. Pointing out the significance of the business judgment rule in
the context of stockholder derivative actions, the court remarked: "It comes into play
in several ways-in addressing a demand, in the determination of demand futility, in
efforts by independent disinterested directors to dismiss the action as inimical to the
corporation's best interests, and generally, as a defense to the merits of the suit." Id.
at 812.
," See id. at 812. After commenting that the protections of the business judgment
rule "can only be claimed by disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the
tests of business judgment," the court remarked: "From the standpoint of interest, this
means that directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to
derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to
a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally." Id.
(citations omitted).
:5 Id.
15 See id.
110See id. at 811.
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insure that shareholders first exhaust their intracorporate remedies.' 61 As the court noted: "[B]y promoting this form of alternate dispute resolution, rather than immediate recourse to
litigation, the demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors manage the business and affairs
of corporations." 6 2
In reviewing the Aronson decision, one commentator has
observed: "Aronson is the culmination of a trend in recent years
toward applying, rather than simply overlooking, the demand
requirement. No longer is the demand requirement simply a
superficial step in the litigation process to be lightly brushed
aside with conclusory pleading."' 163 This emphasis on the demand
requirement may affect future derivative litigation by limiting
the potential for judicial application of the business judgment
rule under the two-step test of Zapata.16 In addition, the court's
adoption of the gross negligence standard for business judgment
cases may well have the effect of strengthening the power of
directors to use the demand requirement to insulate the corpo65
ration from derivative litigation.
B.

Close Corporations

Disputes involving majority-minority relations in closely held
corporations continue to produce a considerable volume of litigation in the state courts.'6 Frequently, these intracorporate
disputes lead to requests by one faction or another for court
ordered dissolution of the corporation. 67 Since dissolution is
such a drastic remedy, it is understandable that courts over the

262

id.
Id. at 812.

213

Welch, Delaware Supreme Court Limits Reach of Business Judgment Rule, THE

161 See

NAT'L L.J. Apr. 30, 1984, at 16-20.
164For a discussion of the demand requirement in derivative litigation see Note,
Demand on Directorsand Shareholders as a Prerequisiteto a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv.
L. Rav. 746 (1960).
16 See generally Cohn, Demise of the Director'sDuty of Care: JudicialAvoidance
of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 Tax. L. REv. 591

(1983) (discussing the need for a realistic standard of care for measuring the conduct of
directors in the context of the business judgment rule).
16 For a comprehensive treatment of the close corporation and the problems
generated by these corporations, see generally F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPO.ATONS: LAW
AND PRAcncE (2d ed. 1971).
267 See id. at § 9.26.
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years have been reluctant to order dissolution in the case of
solvent, viable corporations. 68 However, until recently the provisions of most corporation statutes dealing with involuntary
dissolution were so framed as to contemplate dissolution as the
only available remedy. 169 Under such statutes some courts have
assumed that they are confined to whatever remedy or remedies
are specified in the statute and are not free to order other forms
of equitable relief. 70 A recent case from the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, Meiselman v. Meiselman,'71 illustrates the added
flexibility now being given by statute to courts in some states to

grant whatever relief72 seems most appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
Meiselman represents a typical example of an intracorporate
dispute in a closely held corporation. 73 Michael Meiselman,
plaintiff in the case, had become a minority shareholder in a

'' See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. 1954)
("order [of dissolution] is granted only when the competing interests 'are so discordant
as to prevent efficient management' and the 'object of its corporate existence cannot be
attained') (citing Hitch v. Hawley, [sic] 30 N.E. 401, 404).
'6 See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 166, § 9.28, at 107-08.
110See, e.g., White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Va. 1972) ("IT]he alternatives
provided [by the statute] . . . are exclusive rather than inclusive," hence the trial court
erred in not so constructing its relief.").
M 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
172See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 166, at § 9.31 (discussing two statutory alternatives
to dissolution: 1) court appointed custodian and 2) buy-out of petitioning shareholder's
interest).
" Courts have frequently recognized the similarity between the close corporation
and the partnership and the resulting need for applying the same strict standards of
fiduciary responsibility between the shareholders of a close corporation as between the
members of a partnership. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505, 515 (Mass. 1975), in which the court remarked:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the
partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and
manner of enterprise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the
close corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, we
have defined the standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the
"utmost good faith and loyalty." Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843
(Mass. 1952); Decotis v. D'Antona, 214 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1966). Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard.
They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation
of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation.
Id. at 515 (footnotes omitted).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 73

number of family corporations in which his brother, Ira Meiselman, possessed the majority interest.' 74 The two shareholders

were employed by the family corporations. 75 One of the family
corporations, Eastern Federal Corporation (Eastern), entered into
a management contract with Republic Management Corporation
(Republic), which was solely owned by Ira Meiselman

76

Michael

Meiselman filed a suit against Ira challenging his sole ownership
of the stock in Republic. 7 7 In response, Ira terminated both the
employment contract between Eastern and Republic and Michael's employment in the family corporations.' 78 Michael thereupon filed a complaint asking the court either to dissolve the

family corporations pursuant to the North Carolina involuntary
dissolution statute,1 79 or to order such other relief as it might
deem reasonably necessary to protect Michael's interests. 180 The

,74
307 S.E.2d at 553.
171

Id. at 554.

See id. Quoting from Ira's deposition, the court remarked:
According to Ira, the function of Republic "was to provide a means
whereby, primarily now, administrative and primarily home office expenses
utilized on behalf of all the companies, or all the individual operating
units, were apportioned back to those individual operating units or operating companies." In short, Republic was "nothing more than a tool"
through which the administrative costs incurred in operating the various
Meiselman business units-including over 30 theaters-were apportioned.

176

Id.
In See id. The basis of Michael's suit was that Republic had retained earnings of
over $65,000 which only Ira would enjoy since Michael did not own any stock in
Republic. See id. at 555. Michael claimed that Ira had breached his fiduciary duty to
the several corporate defendants (Meiselman business enterprises) by failing to provide
them with an opportunity to buy stock in Republic. Id. at 567.
Id. at 554.
" See id. at 556. Section 125(a) of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act
provides: "The superior court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business of
a corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established that: ... (4) Liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the
complaining shareholder." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1982).
' See 307 S.E.2d at 556. Section 125.1 of the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act provides:
(a) In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation under
G.S. 55-125(a), the court may make such order or grant such relief, other
than dissolution, as in its discretion it deems appropriate, including, without limitation, an order:
(I) Canceling or altering any provision contained in the charter or the
bylaws of the corporation; or
(2) Canceling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
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trial court denied all relief.' 8' The North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had "misapplied the applicable law and abused its discretion by concluding
that relief, other than dissolution . .. was not reasonably necessary for Michael's protection."'1 82 On appeal by the defendants
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the supreme court, in
a lengthy opinion, sought to articulate the proper analysis a trial
court should use in construing the North Carolina dissolution
83
statutes.'
The supreme court first noted that when there has been a
breakdown in the personal relations among the participants in a
close corporation, their reasonable expectations become difficult
to fulfill.

84

The court also noted that some state legislatures,

including that of North Carolina, had enacted statutes giving
their courts more freedom in granting relief for minority shareholders than previously existed. 85 The court then turned to a
consideration of the standard which should be used "to determine whether a minority shareholder is entitled to dissolution or

corporation; or
(3) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action; or
(4) Providing for the purchase at their fair value of shares of any
shareholder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders, such
fair value to be determined in accordance with such procedures as the
court may provide.
(b) Such relief may be granted as an alternative to a decree of dissolution,
or may be granted whenever the circumstances of the case are such that
relief, but not dissolution, would be appropriate.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982).
307 S.E.2d at 556.
See id. at 557 (emphasis in original). See also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 295
S.E.2d 249, 258 (N.C. App. 1982).
See 307 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 558.
'" Id. at 560. The court noted that:
[A]t least seven states have given their courts the authority to grant dissolution of a corporation when the acts of the directors or those in control
of the corporation are "oppressive" to the shareholders.
... [A]t least three states have statutes authorizing a court to grant
dissolution when those in control of the corporation are guilty of treating
the corporate shareholders "unfairly."
Id. The court further noted that California and New York had statutes similar to North
Carolina's. See id.
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other relief.' ' 1 86 Pointing to the language of the liquidation statute which speaks of protecting the "rights or interests" of the
complaining shareholders' 8 7 the court held that "a complaining shareholder's 'rights or interests' in a close corporation
include the 'reasonable expectations' the complaining shareholder has in the corporation."' 8 8 Earlier in its opinion the court
had remarked that those "reasonable expectations" could include "the parties' expectation that they will participate in the
management of the business or be employed by the company."' 8 9
The first responsibility of the trial court, therefore, would be to
articulate the "rights or interests" of the complaining shareholder taking into account the entire history of the relationship
of all participants in the enterprise from the time of their original
business bargain. 19° The next step for the trial court would be
"to determine if liquidation is 'reasonably necessary' for the
protection of those 'rights or interests.' "191 Acknowledging that
a literal reading of the liquidation statute would suggest that
liquidation was the only form of relief available if a remedy was
"reasonably necessary" to protect the "rights or interests" of
the complaining shareholder, the court said that the liquidation
statute must be read in conjunction with the companion statutory
provision which authorizes the trial court to grant alternative
forms of relief for actions brought under the liquidation sec-

6 See id. at 562.
7 See id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (4)).
'
Id. at 563.
See id. at 558.
190 See id. at 563. Speaking of the "reasonable expectations"
of a complaining
shareholder in a corporation, the court remarked:
These "reasonable expectations" are to be ascertained by examining the
entire history of the participants' relationship. That history will include the
"reasonable expectations" created at the inception of the participants'
relationship; those "reasonable expectations" as altered over time; and the
"reasonable expectations" which develop as the participants engage in a
course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the corporation. The interests
and views of the other participants must be considered in determining
"reasonable expectations." The key is "reasonable." In order for plaintiff's expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to or assumed by
the other shareholders and concurred in by them. Privately held expectations which are not made known to the other participants are not "reasonable." Only expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied,
among the participants should be recognized by the court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
191 Id.
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The supreme court pointed out that this latter statutory
provision authorizes a trial court to grant relief other than
dissolution both when the other relief would be more appropriate
than dissolution and when only relief other than dissolution
would be appropriate. 93
After reviewing the standards to be used by a trial court in
determining whether a minority shareholder would be entitled to
dissolution or other relief, the supreme court turned to the
treatment given by the trial court to Michael Meiselman's complaint. 9 4 Concluding that the trial court had failed to properly
address the "rights or interests" of Michael, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court "for an evidentiary hearing
to resolve this issue." 1 95 The court summarized its conclusions
as follows:
tion.192

On remand, after hearing the evidence, the trial court is to:
(1) articulate specifically Michael's "rights or interests"-his
"reasonable expectations"-in the corporate defendants; and
(2) determine if these "rights or interests" are in need of
protection, and, thus, that relief of some sort should be granted.
In addition, the trial court is to prescribe the form of relief
which the evidence indicates is most appropriate, should it find
that relief is warranted. In remanding this case for an evidentiary hearing and new findings, we need not address the issue
of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant relief to Michael.' 96
Although Meiselman involved interpretation of North Carolina legislation designed to protect minority interests in closely
held corporations, the decision illustrates the growing recognition
that dissolution may not always be the most appropriate remedy
for resolving intracorporate disputes. 97 Justice Martin stated this
well in his concurring opinion in Meiselman when he remarked

192See id.
'"' See id. at 564. The court said: "It is clear, then, when N.C.G.S. §§ 55-125(a)
(4) and 55-125.1(b) are read in conjunction, it must only be 'established' under N.C.G.S.
§ 55-125(a) (4) that reliefof some kind, and not just liquidation, is 'reasonably necessary'
for the protection of the complaining shareholder's 'rights or interests."' Id. (emphasis
in original).
See id. at 564-67.
'+'Id. at 567.
"

Id.

'+'See

generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 166, at § 9.31.
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that "[t]he majority shareholders and the corporation should
not be subject to dissolution, the most drastic form of relief
available, where other statutory rights may provide an adequate
remedy for the minority shareholder." 198

C. Right of Inspection
A recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska,

Knaebel v. Heiner,199 illustrates the potential effect corporate

transactions involving ownership of stock can have on a shareholder's right to inspect the books and records of a corpora-

tion.2 ° Specifically, in the Heiner case, the issue was "whether
a shareholder was deprived of his statutory right to inspect the
records of a corporation, by virtue of a contract requiring him

to exchange his shares for stock in another corporation prior to
' 20
the date of the demand for inspection." '

On April 2, 1979, Jeffrey Knaebel, one of three major shareholders of Resource Associates of Alaska, Inc. (RAA), had
"made an agreement with the company and its other two major

shareholders to exchange all of his RAA shares for all the shares
of a wholly-owned RAA subsidiary. ' 202 The exchange of stock
was to take place not later than October 15, 1980.203 However,
soon after the agreement was made, Knaebel brought a suit to
rescind the agreement. 204 "On October 23, 1980, Knaebel made

[a] written demand under [the Alaska corporation statute] for
inspection of specified RAA records.

' 20 5

On October 28, 1980,

' 307 S.E.2d at 572 (Martin, J., concurring).
119673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983).
1 For a discussion of the basis and nature of the shareholder's right of inspection,
see 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2213 (rev.
perm. ed. 1976).
10'673 P.2d at 885 (footnote omitted).
0 Id. at 885-86.
101Id. at 887.
204

See id. at 886.

101Id. The Alaska Business Corporation Act provides:
A person who has been a shareholder of record for at least six months
immediately preceding his demand or who is the holder of record of at
least five percent of all the outstanding shares of a corporation, upon
written demand stating the purpose of the demand, may, in person or by
agent or attorney, at a reasonable time for a proper purpose, examine and
make extracts from its books and records of account, minutes and record
of shareholders.
ALAsKA STAT. § 10.05.240 (1968). Kentucky has a similar statutory provision. See KRS
§ 271A.260(2) (1981).
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Lawrence Heiner, an officer of RAA who had custody and
control of the RAA records, denied the request for inspection, 2° ,
and "[o]n the following day, October 29, . .. notified Knaebel
that his RAA shares were 'voided effective October 16, 1980'
pursuant to the April 1979 share exchange agreement.' '207 Knaebel then filed a complaint against Heiner seeking to have the
court issue both a preliminary and a permanent injunction compelling inspection of the requested documents. 20 8 While this case
was pending, rescission was denied to Knaebel in his rescission
suit."' Heiner moved for summary judgment in the inspection
suit on the ground that the denial of rescission to Knaebel
"established that Knaebel was not entitled to inspection at the
time of his request. ' 210 The superior court granted summary
21
judgment, and Knaebel appealed. '
The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the grant of summary
judgment as inappropriate. 212 Heiner had argued that, because
of the exchange agreement, Knaebel lost his shareholder status
in RAA as of October 15, 1980.213 Heiner contended that "if
there was a valid contract for the exchange of stock in effect,
which called for performance prior to the date of Knaebel's
demand for inspection, Knaebel could have no right to inspection
after that date.' '2 4 Rejecting this argument, the supreme court
said it could "see no basis for Heiner's position that the agreement by itself effectively cancelled Knaebel's shareholder of
record status as of October 15, 1980, any more than a land sale
contract which specifies a date for closing cancels a recorded

673 P.2d at 886.
Id. (quoting Knaebel v. Heiner, 645 P.2d 201, 202-03 (Alaska 1982)).
21 Id. Heiner moved to dismiss the injunctive suit on the ground that Knaebel was
splitting a cause of action by bringing this suit separately from his suit for rescission.
The trial court dismissed the complaint but the order of dismissal was reversed on appeal
by the Alaska Supreme Court. See id. For the opinion of the supreme court in that
case, see Knaebel v. Heiner, 645 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1982).
-- ' 673 P.2d at 886. This decision was also appealed to the Supreme Court of
Alaska where it was reversed. Id. For the opinion of the supreme court in the rescission
suit, see Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983).
210673 P.2d at 886.
211Id.

22 Id. at 887.
213 Id.

1,4

Id. at 886.
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deed on the specified date. ' 215 Pointing out that by choosing to
disregard the agreement for exchange of stock Knaebel had
apparently remained a shareholder of record in RAA, 2 6 the court
concluded that "Knaebel's right to inspect the corporate records
[of RAA] . .. remained intact both on the date of his demand
21 7
and on the date set for inspection.
Similar questions regarding inspection rights can arise when
shareholders in a corporation seek the appraisal remedy following objections to certain fundamental changes in the organic
structure of the corporation, such as mergers, consolidations, or
sales of the corporate assets. 21 8 An issue of this kind was presented to the Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the Kentucky
Supreme Court) in E.I.F.C., Inc., v. Atnip. 2 9 Shareholders holding a majority of the stock in E.I.F.C. had voted to sell its
assets to another Kentucky corporation. 220 The Atnips, minority
shareholders in E.I.F.C., filed a suit seeking the right to examine
the corporate records. 221 While this suit was pending, the Atnips
brought a separate suit to establish and recover the fair value
of their stock under the Kentucky appraisal statute.' The question before the Court was whether by bringing this latter suit

2,1 Id.
at 887. Emphasizing the executory nature of the agreement, the court added:
"The manner of the 'exchange' of stock referred to in the agreement is not specified,
but it seems reasonable to assume that some form of physical tender was contemplated,
and that unless and until the exchange occurred the agreement, at least on this point,
was executory." Id. (footnotes omitted).

216See id.
2 Id. at 888. In further confirmation of its position that Knaebel had not lost his
inspection rights, the court added:
RAA could have sought specific performance of the split-off agreement,
or it could have acceded to Knaebel's demand for inspection and sued him
for damages for breach of contract. Instead, from the present record it
appears that RAA attempted, after Knaebel's demand for inspection, to
cancel Knaebel's stock, and it does not appear that Knaebel's name was
ever removed from the corporate record.
Id. at 887 (emphasis in original).
211 See, e.g., KRS § 271A.400 (Cum. Supp. 1984). For a general discussion of the
appraisal remedy, see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 138, at § 349.
219 See 454 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1970).
Id. at 351.

Id.
2n Id. The Atnips were one of four groups that sought payment of the fair value
221

of their shares because of their objection to a merger between E.I.F.C., Inc. and T.S.I.,
Inc. See Acree v. E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1973).
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the Atnips had waived their inspection rights. 223 The Court held
that they had not and that they had shown a proper corporate
purpose for examining the books and records of the corporation
as a means of enabling them to establish the fair market value
of their stock. 224
The appraisal statute at the time of Atnip stated that any
shareholder asserting appraisal rights "shall not thereafter be
entitled to vote such shares for any corporate purpose or be
entitled to the payment of dividends or other distribution on
said shares.' ' Despite this provision, the Court treated the
Atnips as shareholders in the corporation entitled to exercise
their inspection rights. 226 This result may no longer be viable in
Kentucky in view of the language of the present appraisal statute
which states that "[a]ny shareholder making [an appraisal] demand shall thereafter be entitled only to payment as provided
in this section and shall not be entitled to vote or to exercise
any other rights of a shareholder.' 227 The present Kentucky
provision was taken from an identical provision in the Model
Business Corporation Act. 228 However, the Model Act has since
been revised to now read: "The dissenter shall retain all other
rights of a shareholder until these rights are modified by effectuation of the proposed corporate action." 229
Thus, the current Model Act provisions conform more nearly
to the approach taken to inspection rights in Heiner by the
Supreme Court of Alaska and in Atnip by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals. 230 Both cases, as well as the current Model Act

2u See 454 S.W.2d at 351.
21 See id.at 352.
-1 See KRS § 271A.415(h) (repealed 1972).
11 See 454 S.W.2d at 352.
- See KRS § 271A.405(l) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
In See MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 81 (rev. ed. 1979) (hereinafter cited as MODEL
ACT). The present Kentucky Business Corporation Act, adopted in 1972, is taken
substantially from the provisions of the Model Act as it read at that time. See Ham,
Kentucky Adopts a New Business Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73, 75 (1972-73).
2" See MODEL ACT § 81(e) (rev. ed. 1979). The appraisal provisions of the Model
Act were extensively revised in 1978. The 1978 revisions were incorporated in the 1979
edition of the Model Act. See id.at §§ 80-81. For discussion of the 1978 changes, see
Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights
(Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAW. 2587 (1977-78).
2"
Such an approach would appear to further the general purpose of inspection
statutes to enable shareholders to keep themselves informed of corporate affairs. See H.
HEN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 138, § 199, at 537.
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provisions, seem to adopt the position that record ownership of
stock with its attendant shareholder rights should remain intact
except as otherwise specifically affected by statute or until the
planned corporate transaction is consummated.23 l Since shareholders frequently need inspection rights to make value judgments regarding their stock ownership, keeping those rights
available until definitive corporate actions have been consum232
mated seems justified.
D.

Voluntary Dissolution

A recent case from the Supreme Court of Texas, Henry I.
Siegel Co. v. Holliday,23 underscores the important responsibilities directors and officers have to corporate creditors in winding
up the affairs of a corporation upon its dissolution. 32 4
Holly Gram, Inc. was a Texas corporation formed by Edna
Holliday and Alfred and Barbara Graham to operate a shoe
store and two dress shops. 2 15 Before the end of their first year
in business, Mrs. Holliday and the Grahams decided to dissolve
the corporation and continue the business as sole proprietor-

23
Record ownership is usually a requirement that must be met under statutory
provisions relating to inspection rights by shareholders. See, e.g., KRS § 271A.260(2).
Inspection by voting trust certificate holders is frequently included and creditors or
holders of debt securities are sometimes included. See H. HENN & J. ALExANDER, supra
note 138, § 199, at 542.
r3 The Kentucky Court recognized this need in Atnip when it remarked as to
shareholders establishing the fair market value of their stock:
It is asserted that an examination of these records will show what others
have paid for their stock in a free, open and competitive market; that
these records will reveal transactions between individual stockholders and
the prices paid for stock; that it would be impossible to show comparative
sales of stock without the examination of these records; and that there is
no other way this information could be obtained.
454 S.W.2d at 352.
23 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984).
21
Corporation statutes typically contain provisions setting forth the procedure to
be followed in bringing about the dissolution of a corporation by voluntary action. See,
e.g., KRS §§ 271A.415-.465 (1981). In Kentucky, after the necessary shareholder approval
has been obtained and a Statement of Intent to Dissolve has been filed with the Secretary
of State, the corporation is required to mail notice of its intent to dissolve to each
known creditor of the corporation, collect its assets, and pay or adequately provide for
the payment of all its obligations before making any distribution of assets to its
shareholders. See KRS § 271A.435.
3
663 S.W.2d at 826.
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ships . 236 Mrs. Holliday was to take over the assets and liabilities
of the shoe store, and the Grahams were to do likewise with the
dress shops . 2 7 No notice of the dissolution was given to the

creditors of Holly Gram.28 Henry I. Siegel Co. (Siegel), a creditor of Holly Gram, sued Mrs. Holliday and the Grahams, as

directors and officers of the corporation, to hold them personally
liable for Holly Gram's debt to Siegel. 2 9 The trial court entered
judgment for Siegel against Mrs. Holliday and the Grahams.
Mrs. Holliday appealed. 240 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment, 24' and this reversal was affirmed by the
2
Supreme Court of Texas . A2
Siegel sought to hold Mrs. Holliday personally liable for

payment of its claim on the basis that the directors of Holly
Gram, upon its dissolution, became trustees of its assets responsible for applying those assets on a pro rata basis to the satis-

faction of the claims of creditors, 2A3 and that, under the "trust

236

Id.

23

Id.

Id. Such notice is required under the Texas Business Corporation Act. The
relevant section provides that before filing articles of dissolution "[t]he corporation shall
cause written notice by registered mail of its intention to dissolve to be mailed to each
known creditor of and claimant against the corporation." Tax. Bus. Coiu. ACT ANN.
art. 6.04 A(2) (Vernon 1980).
23
See 663 S.W.2d at 826.
uO Id.
24
Id. See also Holliday v. Henry I. Siegel Co., 643 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) aff'd, 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984).
2,2 See 663 S.W.2d at 826.
2, Id. Article 6.04 A(3) of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides:
The corporation shall proceed to collect its assets, convey and dispose of
such of its properties as are not to be distributed in kind to its shareholders,
pay, satisfy, or discharge its liabilities and obligations, or make adequate
provision for payment and discharge thereof, and do all other acts required
to liquidate its business and affairs; in case its property and assets are not
sufficient to satisfy or discharge all the corporation's liabilities and obligations, the corporation shall apply them so far as they will go to the just
and equitable payment of the liabilities and obligations. After paying or
discharging all its obligations, or making adequate provision for payment
and discharge thereof, the corporation shall then distribute the remainder
of its assets, either in cash or in kind, among its shareholders according
to their respective rights and interests.
TEX. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 6.04 A(3) (1980). In Siegel, the court remarked as to
the application of this statutory provision: "Because the matter is not material to our
disposition of the case, we assume, without deciding, that the statute dictates a pro rata
distribution of corporate assets to creditors in the instant context." 663 S.W.2d at 826
(footnote omitted). However, the court noted that, while pro rata distribution had at
23
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fund" thereby created, each director became jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of all creditors' claims. 2 " The supreme
court rejected this argument, holding that "[tihe existence of
the so-called 'trust' relationship in situations controlled by the
trust fund doctrine provides no basis for personal liability of
directors, '245 but "only allows corporate creditors to follow the
corporate assets and to subject those assets to the payment of
their claims. '"2 46 The court said that, under the trust fund doctrine, "personal liability of the director arises only because he
has disposed of the assets in such a manner that they cannot be
traced or because he has caused a diminution in the value of the
assets.1 247 Furthermore, the court said that, although Texas statutory law speaks of directors and officers as trustees in a
corporate dissolution who are jointly and severally liable "to
the extent of corporate assets that come into their hands," 248
their joint liability cannot "exceed the value of the corporate
assets that came into their hands by virtue of the dissolution.' '249
Noting that Siegel had made no effort to trace the assets of
Holly Gram and that Mrs. Holliday had paid the creditors of
Holly Gram an amount greater than the total value of the
corporate assets on dissolution, the court concluded that "It]he

one time been the law in Texas, the use of the language "just and equitable" distribution
in the present Texas Business Corporation Act was "evidence that the legislature,
presumably possessed of full knowledge of the existing standard, rejected it and opted
for a new one." Id. at 826 n.1. The court remarked that, as a result of this new
language, "the corporation may now have more flexibility in paying its creditors than
it had before adoption of the Business Corporation Act." Id.
663 S.W.2d at 826.
Id. at 827.
246 Id.
247

Id. at 828 (citations omitted).

m Id. The court's reference here was to art. 1302-2.07 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes dealing with the responsibilities of directors during the three year survival period
following dissolution provided for by this provision. Paragraph B of this article states
in part:
In the exercise of such powers [to liquidate the corporation], the directors
and officers shall be trustees for the benefit of creditors, shareholders,
members, or other distributees of the corporation and shall be jointly and
severally liable to such persons to the extent of the corporate property and
assets that shall have come into their hands.

TEx. REv. Crv.
249

STAT. ANN.

663 S.W.2d at 828.

art. 1302-2.07B (1980).
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limit on her liability has been surpassed, and Siegel cannot hold
'250
her personally liable for its claim.
Siegel represents another example of the difficulties American law has faced as a result of the corporate entity concept
which attributes to the corporation a separate personality from
that of its members.251 As one commentator put it: "The attribution of juridical personality to the corporate entity is the basic
legal norm of all corporation laws; yet, it is also a fundamental
source of confusion at the heart of most corporate law problems.
Such is the case with determining the relationship of a corporation (and its shareholders) to its creditors upon dissolution.' '252

2 0 Id. Earlier in its opinion, the court had observed:

It is undisputed that Mrs. Holliday has paid more money in discharge of
the debts of Holly Gram than the value of all corporate assets at the time
of dissolution. The trial court found those assets were worth about $20,000,
and Mrs. Holliday received assets with a value of $10,000. After dissolution, Mrs. Holliday paid a total of $26,000 to various Holly Gram creditors.
Id. at 826.
2,
The entity concept, which personifies a corporation and gives the corporation a
legal status separate and distinct from its members, became one of the cornerstones of
Anglo-American jurisprudence as to the nature of a corporation. See H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER,

supra note 138, at § 78.

Norton, Relationship of Shareholdersto Corporate Creditors Upon Dissolution:
Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of CorporateAssets, 30 Bus.
LAw. 1061, 1061 (1975) (footnote omitted).
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